Creditors\u27 Rights: Conveyances in Fraud of Subsequent Creditors by Walden, Cecil D.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 40 | Issue 4 Article 9
1952
Creditors' Rights: Conveyances in Fraud of
Subsequent Creditors
Cecil D. Walden
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walden, Cecil D. (1952) "Creditors' Rights: Conveyances in Fraud of Subsequent Creditors," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 40 : Iss. 4 ,
Article 9.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol40/iss4/9
NOTES AND CoIIENTs
of water use, such as the theory of prior appropriation32 prevalent in
Western states.
HuGHi C. EvANs
CREDITORS' RIGHTS: CONVEYANCES IN
FRAUD OF SUBSEQUENT CREDITORS
One of the earliest and most perplexing problems encountered in
the field of jurisprudence was that of aiding creditors in the collection
of their just debts. The axiom that "necessity is the mother of mven-
tion" might here be changed to read, "necessity is the mother of pro-
tection" That debtors early acquired habits and methods of putting
their property beyond the reach of creditors is indicated by the fact
that even the Romans found a need for regulations to prevent such
fraud.i Later, in England, several statutes designed to prevent this
evil were passed.2 The most famous of these was the Statute of 13
Elizabeth, 3 which provided that every conveyance made to the end,
purpose and intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others of
their just and lawful actions would be void.4 At the common law, in
jurisdictions that did not have statutes such as this, only those creditors
whose claims were in existence at the time a conveyance was made
could attack it.5 One whose claim came into existence after the con-
veyance could not complain. Not until the advent of statutes like the
English statute, which included the words "and others," did the courts
bring subsequent creditors within the rule.6 At a glance it is ap-
e. 262. There are of course obvious difficulties for the individual farmer under
tlus method, such as inability to secure the agreement of interest of his neighbors
or the lack of other farmers in the area where he may be, etc.
The doctrine of prior appropriation was adopted by most of the states in
the and and semiarid western states because the common law of riparian rights
was not suited to their region. Under this doctrine the one who first diverts and
applies to a beneficial use the water of a stream has a pnor right to the use therein
to the extent of his appropriation. Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v. New Loveland
& Img. & Land Co., 40 Colo. 382, 93 P 485 (1807). For lustoncal explanation
of law of prior appropnation, see In re Hood River, 114 Ore. 112, 227 P. 1065
(1924).
'BucLabND, TBE MAiN INsTiTuTiONs OF ROmmN PRIVATE LAW 339 (1931).
27 Eliz. C. 4 (1585); 3 Henry VII C. 4 (1486); 50 Edw. III C. 6 (1376).
13 Eliz. C. 5 (1570). It has been stated that this statute and those above,
are merely declaratory of the common law. See Springer v. Drosch, 32 Ind. 486
(1870).
'Ibid.
Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Oluo 469 (1842).
1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 554 (rev. ed. 1940); 24 Am. Jun.
164 (1939). The circumstances under which a conveyance can be said to be
fraudulent were first set out in Twyne s Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80 b (1601), which has
been frequently quoted and discussed where the problem of this type of transfer
has arisen.
KENTUcKY LAW JOuRNAL
parent that the Kentucky statute7 is very much like the statute of 13
Elizabeth, so that subsequent creditors may be brought within its pur-
view The language is: "Every gift, conveyance, assignment or trans-
fer of, or charge upon, any estate, real or personal, or right or thing in
action, or any rent or profit thereof, made with the intent to delay,
lunder or defraud creditors, purchasers or other persons, and every
bond or other evidence of debt given, action commenced or judgment
suffered, shall be void as against such creditors, purchasers and
other persons. "8
No detailed exposition of the growth and principles of the law of
fraudulent conveyances will be attempted herein, but rather an analy-
sis of the Kentucky law with regard to those principles governing fraud
upon those creditors known as subsequent or future creditors. How-
ever, first it might be well to examine a few fundamental concepts of
the law of fraudulent conveyances, particularly as pertaming to exist-
mg creditors. It is an established principle that one who alleges fraud
must prove itY Thus where a conveyance is attacked as fraudulent,
the complainant has the burden of proving that the transaction was
tainted in any way,'0 the presumption being against, rather than in
favor of the existence of any fraud.1 The question is one of fact
which may be established, if necessary, by circumstantial evidence.12
If a conveyance is made "without valuable consideration", 3 such
conveyance is declared by statute to be void as to all existing creditors
and may be set aside by them.14 A question arises as to what the rule
'Ky. R Ev. STAT. sec. 378.010 (1948).8 Ibid.
'1 JONES, EVIDENCE 365 (4th ed. 1938); 20 Am. Jun. 146 (1939).
o Taulbee v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 279 Ky. 153, 130 S.W 2d 48 (1939);
Whitaker v. Davidson, 209 Ky. 698, 273 S.W 485 (1925); Hickman Bank and
Trust Co. v. Pickard and Mayberry, 207 Ky. 772, 270 S.W 30 (1925). See Stew-
art v. Wheeler, 220 Ky. 687, 689, 295 S.W 991, 992 (1927).
' Hickman Bank and Trust Co. v. Pickard and Mayberry, 207 Ky. 772, 776,
270 S.W 30, 32 (1925), wherein the court stated: "Fraud is never presumed.
It must be established by the weight of the evidence, but nevertheless it must be
convincing."
"The rule is that m every case there must be such legal evidence as is suf-
ficient to overcome in the mind the legal presumption of innocence, and beget a
belief of truth of the allegation of fraud."
"Ibid.
' Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 378.020 (1945) provides: "Every gift, conveyance,
assignment, transfer or charge made by a debtor, of or upon any of his estate
without valuable consideration therefor, shall be void as to all his existing creditors,
but shall not, on that account alone, be void as to creditors whose claims are
thereafter contracted. " (Italics of writer.)
' Hays v. Cyrus, 252 Ky. 435, 67 S.W 2d 503 (1934); Hatcher-Powers Shoe
Co. v. Sparks, 237 Ky. 321, 35 S.W 2d 564 (1931). This seemingly "obsolete"
gift-by-debtors law has been severely criticized. See Marks, Kentucky s Obsolete
Law on Gifts by Debtors, 39 Ky. LAw Jour-AL 456. See also 3 WILLSToN,
SAT s 462 (1948).
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m Kentucky would be m a case where the debtor has conveyed for m-
adequate consideration, but was not at the time either insolvent, or
rendered so by the transfer. The majority of states ,m tis situation,
have made solvency, rather than the mere owing of some debts by the
debtor, the important consideration, and permit a conclusive presump-
tion only where the debtor was in fact insolvent or rendered so there-
by . 1 Where the debtor is not insolvent, any presumption in favor of
the attacking creditor is made to depend upon the amount of the in-
debtedness. If the debt is small, there is only a slight presumption
of fraud. If the debt is large, there is a prima facie presumption estab-
lished. Any such rationalization under the Kentucky gift-by-debtor
law, however, appears precluded by the stringent rule of law that in-
debtedness coupled with inadequate consideration is fraudulent. In
so far as consideration is concerned, the only possible controversy in
a case of transfer by a debtor is whether or not what he received in
return is in fact inadequate consideration.16 If it is, the transfer is what
is termed "without valuable consideration,"17 and is absolutely void as
to pre-emsting creditors.18
Anyone whose claim arose after the voluntary transfer is not pro-
tected by the above statute, and must show actual intent to defraud
him. 19 As one textwritere 9 has stated:
"The law draws a sharp distinction between the rights of creditors
whose clans eisted at the time when the transfer was made, and
creditors whose claims arose subsequently.""
The distinction itself is not difficult to make. A subsequent creditor
has been defined in Kentucky as one whose debts were both po-
tentially and actually created after the fraudulent transaction.22 The
real problem arises in determining what principles of law are to be
followed in the process of determining the debtors intention to de-
1 GLENN, FRAuDuLTr CoNvEYANcEs 458 (rev. ed. 1940); Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyances Act, Sec. 4 (1918).18Carter & Co. v. Richardson & Co., 22 K. L. R. 1204, 60 S.W 397 (1901).
" See note 15, supra.
s ibid.
" Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., for Use and Benefit of Tn-City
Utilities Co. v. Fitch, 63 F Supp. 989 (W D. Ky. 1946); Farmers Bank of Dry
Ridge v. Ashcraft's Adm r., 281 Ky. 758, 137 S.W 2d 422 (1940); Liberty Bank
& Trust Co. v. Davis, 281 Ky. 51, 134 S.W 2d 988 (1939); Harlin v. Calvert's
Adm x, 253 Ky. 752, 70 S.W 2d 524 (1934); Combs v. Poulos, 241 Ky. 617, 621,
44 S.W 2d 571, 573 (1931). Where the language used is that: "In such case
the immediate parties to the transaction may not have intended to defraud, nor
entertained an evil motive, but the law denounces such acts as obstructive to the
creditor of the transferer and permits hun to nullify the transaction in an appro-
pnate proceeding."
' 3 WILLISON, SALEs 464 (1948).
n Ibid.
I Combs v. Poulos, 241 Ky. 617, 44 S.W 2d 571 (1931).
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fraud his subsequent creditor. As stated earlier, it is the accepted rule
in Kentucky that in order for a voluntary conveyance to be set aside
by a future creditor, an actual fraudulent intent on the part of the
debtor must be shown.23 But suppose that at the time the transfer is
attacked, some of the debtors old obligations remain unpaid? This is
of no avail in the cases involving voluntary conveyances for the rule
will permit a showing of nothing less than an actual fraudulent intent
to avoid as against future creditors.24 Some states, following the con-
trary English rule, allow a presumption of fraud on the debtor s part,
in favor of future creditors, where old debts existing at the time of the
transfer still remain unpaid.2 5
To be distinguished from the above questions arising under the
"gift-by-debtors" law, K.R.S. 878.020, are questions involving actual
fraud. It is an unquestioned general rule that where actual intent to
defraud a subsequent creditor is shown, he may always set a con-
veyance aside.2 6 This holds true whether the question is one concern-
ing a voluntary conveyance or otherwise. Whether or not the sub-
sequent creditor may never set a conveyance aside unless he shows
actual intent to defraud his class is open to question. There appears
to be one situation in Kentucky and in those states which have adopted
the Uniform Act, in which a subsequent creditor is aided by a pre-
sumption without a showing of actual fraud directed toward his
class. 2  Where actual fraud toward existing creditors is proved under
K.R.S. 378.010,28 by the subsequent creditor the conveyance is pre-
sumed to be fraudulent as to the latter.2 9 Thus for all practical pur-
poses, the status of the two types of creditors is equal in cases of actual
fraud. The principle has been stated generally that a subsequent
creditor can never set aside a conveyance unless he shows fraud upon
his class. This is an entirely correct statement if it be qualified by the
further principle that fraud as to existing creditors may sometimes
= See note 19, supra.
' It was stated in one Kentucky case that: " there will be no presumption
of a fradulent intent on the part of the grantor in a voluntary conveyance either
to his wife or other in favor of a subsequent creditor, but if the proof shows actual
fraudulent intent on the part of the grantor to place his property beyond the reach
of subsequent creditors, equity will interfere and assist the creditor in the collection
of his debts." See Marcum v. Marcum, 177 Ky. 186, 197 S.W 655, 656 (1917).
11 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 560 (rev. ed. 1940); BIorErow, FRAUD-
ULENT CONVEYANCES 98 (rev. ed.) 1911). Both authorities point out that a few
states in applying the English rule, ignored the question of whether or not the old
debts were still owing, but were clearly wrong in such application.
" 3 POMEROY, EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE 879 (5th ed. 1943). In Kentucky this
general pnnciple receives statutory codification m KRS 378.020.
'Wyan v. Raisin Monumental Co., 243 Ky. 431, 48 S.W 2d 1050 (1932);
James v. Stokes, 203 Ky. 127, 261 S.W 868 (1924).
s See note 9, supra.
See note 27, supra.
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carry over so that fraud on the subsequent creditor is thereby con-
sidered proved. But suppose the subsequent creditor can show no
such actual fraud toward existing creditors. It is here that his lot be-
comes a hard one.
The ease of proving fraud, an issue in every fraudulent conveyance
case, has brought about a difference in the rights of the two principal
types of claimants. It is easy to see why this is true. The task of show-
ing the effect of a debtor s diminution of his present estate upon his
ability to meet existing obligations is relatively simple. But once the
transaction is completed, it is much more difficult to connect it with
some future liability If the subsequent debt arose a great length of
time afterward, the connection is especially difficult to show 3 0 Some-
thing must be found which justifies the statement that the debtor in-
tended to injure the future creditor.3 '
Proof of fraudulent intent in cases involving existing creditors is
not nearly as difficult since such proof is governed by the so-called
"badges of fraud" 32 In the language of the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals:33
"There are circumstances whch so frequently attend upon convey-
ances intended to lunder, delay and defraud creditors, that they are
denomnated 'badges of fraud' and while they do not raise a con-
clusive presumption of fraud, their effect is to impose certain duties
upon the grantee in the conveyance upon which such badges of
fraud attend.
"So, where badges of fraud attend upon a conveyance, their effect is to
shift to the grantee the burden of evidence; and he must rebut the
inferences thereby created, and sustain the bona fides of the trans-
action."3'
Some of the badges of fraud enumerated include: (1) fictitiousness of
consideration and false statements; (2) inadequacy of consideration;
(3) concealment or failure to record a conveyance; (4) insolvency of
grantor or considerable indebtedness; (5) transfer of all the debtors
' Marler v. A. L. Greenburg Iron Co., 216 Ky. 682, 288 S.W 676 (1926);
28 ILL. L. R. 673 (1927).
' wo instances where the future creditor may often if not invariably justify
his claim are: (1) where the debtor has conveyed without fair consideration in
contemplation of embarlang upon a new business, or it is sometimes called a
"hazardous undertakang" and, (2) where the debtor has conveyed without fair
consideration just before he incurred new debts. Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ances Act, see. 5 and 6. See also 1 GLENN, FRA, DvLENr CONVEYANCES 579 (rev.
ed. 1940); 3 PoMEoy, EQUITY JURisPRUDENCE 880 (5th ed. 1948). See also 24
Am. Jun. 286 (1939); 37 Corn'. Jun. SEcur .962 (1947).
S24 Am. Jur. 173 (1939).
Magic City Coal & Feed Co. v. Lewis, 164 Ky. 454, 455, 175 S.W 992,
993 (1915).
Id. at 456, S.W at 993. See also, Myers Dry Goods Co. v. Webb, 297 Ky.
696, 181 S.W 2d 56 (1944).
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property when he is embarrassed or insolvent; (6) failure of parties
to testify If the creditor can show any of the above then he has shifted
upon the defendants a burden of explanation.35
In conclusion, the rights of a subsequent creditor to set aside a
conveyance in Kentucky may be set out as follows: (1) The fact that
a conveyance is voluntary under K.R.S. 878.020- that is, the gift-by-
debtors law -affords him no protection at all; he must still show
actual fraudulent intent, directed toward his class, subsequent creditors.
His problem is mainly one of proof; (2) If a conveyance is attacked
by a future creditor under K.R.S. 878.010, on the ground that it was
made to "hmder, delay and defraud creditors", he may sometimes win
hs case by showing actual fraud directed toward present creditors.
But, if he is unable to do this, his problem again becomes one of prov-
ing actual fraudulent intent directed against his particular class of
creditors. In such case the right of these future creditors, in Kentucky
as elsewhere, depends upon the salient facts of the individual case.30
If these facts show an intent to defraud such creditors, protection is in
order. If not, there can be no protection. In the final analysis, the en-
tire problem involves a weighing of the debtor s interest in the free
use and disposal of his property as opposed to the future creditors in-
terest in protecting his claim.
CEciL D. WALDEN
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AS APPLIED TO MILITARY
PERSONNEL
The Supreme Court of the United States has decided in a recent
case' which included two other actions2 that servicemen cannot re-
cover under the Federal Tort Claims Act,3 for injuries which arise out
of or are in the course of activity incident to military service. This
' Campbell v. First National Bank of Barbourville, 234 Ky. 697, 701, 27 S.W
2d 975, 977 (1930).
' Peyton v. Webb, 29 Ky. L. R. 1151, 1153, 96 S.W 839, 840 (1906) where
the court said that each creditor who attacks a conveyance has the burden of show-
ing "by facts or circumstances that the conveyance was made with a fraudulent
intent before the property can be subjected. It is the intent and purpose with
which the debtor acts that renders the conveyance fraudulent, and this must be
determined by the facts of each particular case."
'Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S. Ct. 153 (1950).
Jefferson v. United States, 178 F 2d 518 (C.C.A. 4th 1949); United States
v. Griggs, 178 F 2d 1 (C.C.A. 10th 1949).
360 Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U. S. C. sees. 921-46 (1946). Now contained in
the newly revised Judicial Code in sees. 1291, 1346 (b), 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401,
2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1948).
